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Back to the Future of Cyber Insurance 
Tom Baker 
As any student of insurance history knows, it can be too soon to study an insurance 
market.  A far more entrepreneurial business than outsiders realize, insurers regularly develop 
new products that don’t work out.   When one does work out, the mature product may not look 
much like the lightbulb that went off in the heads of the underwriters who invented it.  So, if 
you study a new insurance product market too early, you’ll get the wrong idea of what it’s 
about. 
When Leib Dodell described to me – at my dinner table in West Hartford over 20 years 
ago – the Safety ‘Net product that Chubb was getting ready to launch, I knew immediately that I 
was in the presence of one of those crazy underwriters.  Inside Leib’s lightbulb, Safety ‘Net was 
“internet liability insurance,” which meant media liability insurance for the thousands of Main 
Street businesses that were becoming publishers by virtue of putting up a webpage.   
Elsewhere in the universe at about the same time, Emily Freeman had a different 
lightbulb.  Emily and her colleagues at Marsh developed Net Secure, the first “online insurance 
program,” which meant business interruption insurance for “internet businesses” facing 
downtime from hacking, fraud, and viruses, with some liability and privacy loss protection as 
well.* 
I caught up with Leib recently, by phone from his newest venture, Bar K, an emerging 
chain of dog park bars (yes, you read that correctly) that make productive use of distressed 
space inside city cores.  I asked Leib to first imagine himself back at his Safety ‘Net lightbulb 
moment and then to imagine himself immediately transported back to today: What surprises 
you about the cyber insurance market in 2019?  What’s the same today as back then? 
Leib said that he was most surprised that the “first party” breach coverage turned out to 
be more significant for most people than the liability coverage. “That means Emily Freeman was 
right at the beginning, and I was wrong,” he said.  What is the same, he said, maybe even to a 
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surprising extent, is the uncertainty.  The risks are still significantly unknown, the policies 
continue to evolve, and, as a result, pricing continues to involve lots of trial and error. 
Leib’s trip back to the future convinced me of two things.  First, it’s not too early to 
study the cyber insurance market.  Leib may not have been right at the beginning, but he says 
that Emily Freeman was.  That means there are twenty years of enough continuity that we 
ought to be able to make sense of what the cyber insurance market does and how it works.  
Second, there is at least one very big continuity that clearly deserves our attention:  How have 
insurers managed for over twenty years to sell insurance against cyber risks that their 
underwriters don’t (and can’t) fully understand? 
It’s still early in my study, but I have a preliminary answer to that question that I’ve 
shared with Leib, as well as some cyber insurance professionals who haven’t abandoned 
insurance in favor of urban development.  They have encouraged me to share that answer with 
readers of the PLUS Journal.   I encourage you to let me know where I’m right and where I’m 
wrong, because there is still plenty of time for me to get it right.   
My answer comes in five and a half parts.  The five are (1) providing valuable services 
beyond risk transfer, (2) contract design, (3) rapid iteration of pricing and forms, (4) limits 
management and reinsurance, and (5) claims disputing.  The final half is public backstops and 
pools, which is a “half” because it hasn’t yet gone beyond the talking phase.   
Beyond risk transfer.  Most notably to me, cyber insurers manage uncertainty by 
providing lots of easy-to-price loss prevention and loss mitigation services, so that the value 
proposition of a cyber policy includes “free” or low cost access to these high quality services, 
not just the risk transfer that typically motivates insurance purchase.  These services often 
include risk assessments and intrusion testing, and they almost always include expert assistance 
in responding to privacy breaches, ransomware attacks, data destruction, and other cyber 
events.  For many people, these services may be the most salient aspects of the coverage.   
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I include these services as uncertainty management tools for several reasons.  First, the 
tools aim to reduce the frequency and severity of cyber losses, potentially reducing insurers’ 
losses, especially the crucial area under the right tail of insurers’ loss distribution.  Second, to 
gain access to the post event services, policyholders must report those events to their insurers, 
allowing insurers to gather more and better data about loss events that they can use in contract 
design, pricing and underwriting.  Finally, these services help insurers build demand for cyber 
insurance without exposing too much of their balance sheets to the underlying cyber risks. 
Contract design.  Insurers use contract design to manage cyber uncertainties in both 
cyber and non-cyber policies.  In cyber policies, the key elements are narrowly defined coverage 
categories, typically with separate limits for each, and claims-made coverage for liability risks.  
The narrowly defined categories and limits interact with the rapid iteration of pricing and forms 
(which I’ll describe next) to allow insurers to dip their toes in the water and only gradually go in 
deeper.  The first party risks that provide the bulk of the protection have a relatively short tail, 
allowing insurers to get out of the water relatively quickly if they need to. The claims made 
coverage for the liability risks gives insurers some comfort that they can get out of the water 
quickly on the liability side, too.   
In non-cyber policies, like traditional property, general liability, and errors and omissions 
policies, the most important cyber risk design element is the exclusion, to manage the “silent 
cyber” coverage under those policies and shift coverage to cyber policies. There is also an 
emerging trend, at least in the property insurance market, of a cyber coverage sublimit that, in 
effect, gives back part of the coverage for cyber risks that would otherwise be excluded, similar 
to the flood sublimits in commercial property programs.  
Rapid iteration of pricing and forms. One very important way for insurers to manage 
uncertainty is to pay close attention to the results under their current book of policies and then 
to regularly and rapidly update policy forms and prices based on that information.  Leib says 
that’s what he did at the beginning, and that’s what I observe insurers doing today.   All that 
updating can drive some people crazy, and it means that the results under old policy forms 
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become increasingly less relevant for future pricing.  But that’s a tradeoff that allows insurers to 
venture into the unknown.  Rate and form regulation complicate that rapid iteration, so cyber 
policies typically are issued in the surplus lines market, which is largely exempt from that 
regulation.   
Updating traditional policies, which are subject to that rate and form regulation, is more 
cumbersome.  As a result, fine tuning the approach to the silent cyber coverage in a traditional 
policy will take longer than fine tuning a cyber policy.  As a corollary, explicit grants of cyber 
cover will remain largely the province of cyber policies, at least for now, except perhaps in the 
large commercial market, where regulation is less intrusive because regulators expect that 
brokers and risk managers generally provide adequate protection for policyholders. 
Limits management and reinsurance.  For insurers, limits management and reinsurance 
are two different, but highly complementary strategies for managing uncertainty.  Limits 
management is a complicated topic that perhaps can best be explained by identifying the key 
moving parts:  the amount of the cover provided to any particular customer against any 
particular set of risks; the amount of cover provided to each customer segment against a set of 
risks; the amount of cover provided overall against a set of risks; and the relationship of all 
these things to the other risk and customer segments of the insurer.  The most complicated 
parts include assessing the relative risks of different customer sectors and assessing the 
potential for aggregation (in other words, lots of claims all at the same time) within and across 
sectors.  Reinsurance is a complementary strategy, because reinsurance contracts can be 
crafted to share or cap the insurer’s exposure on a customer, customer segment, product 
segment, or company wide basis (and other ways as well). 
Reinsurers need their own limits management strategy, too.  They need to decide how 
much cover they’re willing to provide to any particular insurer against any particular set of risks.  
They need to segment their insurer customers.  And they need to track and manage their 
exposure, not only on an insurer by insurer, segment by segment, and product line by product 
line basis, but also according to their exposure to specific large policyholder companies (which 
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buy towers of insurance from multiple insurance companies), on both the liability and asset 
sides of their balance sheet.   
Not surprisingly, reinsurers are highly focused on the uncertainties of cyber risks.  They 
and their vendors are building tools to track and model cyber risks.  They are engaging with 
technical experts to understand and assess cyber risk, especially from an aggregation 
perspective.  And, so far at least, they are selling cyber reinsurance only on a quota share basis, 
meaning that they share a fixed percentage of the reinsured risk with the ceding insurer from 
the first dollar all the way up to the limit of the reinsurance contract.  Reinsurers are not yet 
willing to sell cyber reinsurance on an excess of loss basis (a form of reinsurance in which the 
reinsurer pays all or a share of losses after the ceding insurer pays a certain amount) because 
they are not prepared to reinsure only the (more uncertain) right tail of the loss distribution. 
Claims disputing.  Almost nobody in the insurance industry likes to talk much about 
claims disputing.  But claims disputing can be an important uncertainty management tool.  
Claims disputing provides the opportunity for a deeper dive into the circumstances of a big loss 
than would otherwise generally be the case, generating knowledge that has the potential to 
inform underwriting and contract design.  Claims disputing also clarifies the meaning of 
insurance policies and, thus, the boundary of the risk transfer.  This has been especially 
important for silent cyber, and the current litigation regarding war exclusions in cyber policies 
suggests that claim disputing will help define the boundaries of the risk transfer under cyber 
policies as well.        
Public sector backstops and pools.  The litigation over the application of the war 
exclusion points to my final category: public backstops and pools.  The concern underlying the 
war exclusion litigation is that state-sponsored or state-encouraged cyber attacks differ from 
ordinary cyber attacks in at least two important ways.   
First, ordinary cyber events are more like ordinary crime and negligence and, typically, 
are not intended to destroy the businesses affected.  When the perpetrator acts with intention, 
the objective typically is theft or ransom.  When the objective is theft, the perpetrator tries 
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hard not to disrupt the business; where the objective is ransom, the perpetrator needs to 
provide credible evidence that the disruption can be undone, or the business will not pay the 
ransom.  By contrast, state sponsored or encouraged cyber attacks are more like terrorism: the 
objective is permanent destruction, greatly increasing the business interruption loss, the costs 
of rebuilding the system, and the data restoration loss. 
Second, state sponsored or encouraged cyber attacks are more likely to be directed to 
cause maximum destruction, shutting down essential services, or replicating on a massive scale.  
This raises concerns about loss aggregation, which, as we learned from the impact of the 
terrorist attack of 9/11 on life and workers compensation insurers, can affect insurers in 
unforeseen ways. 
These differences suggest that there may be a role for the public sector in arranging 
financial backstops or pools for at least some cyber risks.  While it’s too early to identify the 
precise justification for this kind of arrangement, candidates include the destructive impact of a 
massively aggregated loss on insurer capital, the fairness of using public funds for projects that 
benefit society as a whole, the social security provided by having a backstop in place, and the 
potential consideration that the insurance industry could be asked to provide to the 
government in return for these arrangements, such as cyber event data and cooperation in 
disseminating best practices.  
 
 
* Edmundo Conchas, Web retailers clamor for ‘hacker insurance,’ Dallas Business Journal, September 24, 2000. 
